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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

CaseNo.20030868-CA

DUSTIN MARSHALL,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his conviction for equity skimming, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-522 (1999) (in Addendum A). This
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue 1.

Defendant was charged and bound over for committing equity

skimming "on or between July 19, 2002 and October 15, 2002," the parties both
addressed relevant evidence at trial spanning July 19 through July 30, but the
elements jury instruction stated that the offense occurred "on or around July 19[.]"
A. Did the district court have jurisdiction over the offense?

B. Did defense counsel render ineffective assistance by failing to demand
an additional preliminary hearing involving the evidence of equity skimming
involving only the July 19 transaction?
Standards of Review
A. "The determination of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is
a question of law, which [this Court] review[s] for correctness[.]" Beaver v.
Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81, \ 8, 31 P.3d 1147.
B. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised for the first time on
appeal are reviewed as a matter of law. State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, \ 20, 984
P.2d 376.
Issue 2, Did the prosecutor's closing remarks constitute plain error where,
without objection by defendant, the remarks accurately restated the testimony of
three witnesses from the State's point of view?
Standard of Review—This unpreserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct
is reviewed for plain error. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). To
establish plain error, defendant must establish the existence of an error that
should have been obvious to the trial court and that resulted in prejudice to
defendant. Id.
Issue 3. Did defense counsel render ineffective assistance in any of the
eight ways identified by defendant, where defendant fails to establish that counsel
performed below a reasonable objective standard or could not have acted pursuant
to objectively reasonable trial strategy?
2

Standard of Review Ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised for the
first time on appeal are reviewed as a matter of law. See State v. Litherland, 2000
UT 76, U 2, 12 P.3d 92; see also Maestas, 1999 UT 32, \ 20. Because defendant
raised one of his ineffective assistance claims below, that claim is reviewed on
appeal as a mixed question of law and fact. See State v. Mecham, 2000 UT App
247,^jl9,9P.3d777.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On Jan 15, 2003, defendant was charged by information with one count of
equity skimming, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-522
(1999) (R. 7). Add. A. On defendant's motion, four counts of arranging or
brokering motor vehicles without a license, class A misdemeanors, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-201 (1999), were combined with the felony case (R.
132:3-4).
Defendant waived any right to a preliminary hearing on the misdemeanors
but did request a preliminary hearing on the equity skimming charge (R. 36; R.
132:3). Defendant was bound over on the information as charged with no
modification or amendment (R. 36; R. 132:45) (bindover ruling in Addendum A).
The information charged defendant with committing equity skimming "on or
between July 19, 2002 and October 15, 2002" (R. 7) (in Addendum A). No
charges were dismissed (R. 132).

3

After a two-day trial, the jury found defendant guilty on all charges (R. 13637, 140, 142, 144, 146, 148). Defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict or in the alternative for a new trial (R. 184-88). At sentencing the court
denied defendant's motions and sentenced defendant to a prison term of zero to
five years for the felony, with six-month terms on the misdemeanors to run
concurrently (R. 202-04, 247-49). Defendant timely appealed, sought a stay
pending appeal, then obtained new counsel (R. 205-06, 207-08, 226-27, 250-52).
Defendant's new counsel applied for a certificate of probable cause under
Rule 27, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, to release defendant pending the
outcome of the appeal (R. 232-45). At the motion hearing, the court specifically
denied the petition on the two grounds defendant raised, but raised sua sponte an
issue regarding the date of the offense stated injury instruction 14 and granted the
motion based on that issue (R. 255-56, 261-63; R. 291:17, 18-19; referring to
instruction no. 14atR. 167).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
Defendant, a salesperson for Mountain States Motors ["MSM"] in Vernal,
Utah, was not licensed to sell cars (R. 268:209). He knew he needed a license,
but he "didn't think it was that big of a deal," to get the license before he started
selling cars (R. 268:210). Defendant sold a truck to Chade Abplanalp, a 1996
1 Except as otherwise noted, this brief recites the facts in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, H 2,12 P.3d 92.

4

Monte Carlo to Luke and Jamie Fausett, and at least three other cars for MSM, all
for a commission, all without a license (R. 268:152, 224, 231-232).
The July 19 Events
On July 19th, 2002, nineteen-year-old Chade Abplanalp visited MSM and
talked to defendant about buying a new vehicle (R. 267:57-58, 261). He settled
on a 1999 Chevy S-10 truck ["S-10"] and discussed with defendant prices and a
trade in of Abplanalp's 1996 Chevy Monte Carlo ["Monte Carlo"] (R. 267:58).
As they discussed the purchase, Abplanalp told defendant that he still owed
Mountain America Credit Union ["Mountain America"] $3,400 to $3,600 on the
Monte Carlo (R. 267:59, 73, 78; R. 268:258). Defendant said there would be "no
problem" with the amount owed to Mountain America (R. 267:59-60). MSM
credited Abplanalp $5,000 towards purchase of the truck for having traded in the
Monte Carlo (R. 267:72; R. 268:247).
Defendant produced a Motor Vehicle Sale Contract which contained a line
for "balance owed on trade in," and that line said "0" (R. 267:63; R. 268:265;
pi's exh 3). Abplanalp testified that he doesn't know "car sales laws" or much
about "how contracts work," but he did know that there was a balance owed to
Mountain America, so he asked defendant what the zeros on that line meant (R.
267:64, 77; R. 268:265). Defendant told Abplanalp that the zeros meant that
MSM would be responsible for the payoff of the Monte Carlo (R. 267:64; R.
268:265, 267).
5

At defendant's request, Abplanalp signed a pay off authorization form that
required his Mountain America account number and the Monte Carlo
identification information (R. 267:62, 75; R. 268:263, 266). Abplanalp was
familiar with the pay off authorization form and was able to describe the size
(8.5" x 3") and color of the document before seeing it in court (R. 132: 19; pi's
exh 6). That document, titled, "Authorization for Payoff," allows the dealer to
pay the balance owing on a vehicle and obtain the title (R. 267:76; R. 268:266).
Defendant testified that he never gave Abplanalp that form because it was not
needed, as Abplanalp remained responsible to pay off the Monte Carlo (R.
268:235).
The July 23 Events
Abplanalp closed the deal on the truck with defendant on July 23, 2002, by
delivering a check for $10,000 to defendant, turning the Monte Carlo over to
MSM, and taking possession of the truck (R. 268:218-19). Although defendant
testified that he knew that Abplanalp owed a balance on the Monte Carlo,
defendant did not attempt to verify that the balance had been paid before closing
the deal and taking the Monte Carlo (R. 268:234, 236, 237, 238).
The July 30 Events
Seven days later, on July 30th, 2002, defendant sold the Monte Carlo to
Luke and Jamie Fausett, without a license to sell cars, and without verifying that
MSM had title to the Monte Carlo or that the Monte Carlo had ever been paid off
6

(R. 268:123, 239, 240; pi's exh 7). MSM never obtained title to the Monte Carlo,
requiring that it rescind the sale between defendant and the Fausetts and repossess
the vehicle (R. 268:126, 127, 134, 136, 137, 140).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Contrary to defendant's claim, the district court bound defendant over on
the charge in the information, giving the district court jurisdiction to try defendant
on that charge. Further, defendant was tried on the exact charge that was bound
over, namely, equity skimming committed "on or between July 19, 2002 and
October 15, 2002." Defendant's affirmative approval of the jury instructions
below amounts to invited error and prevents any appellate review of the jury
instruction for manifest error. Even undertaking such review, defendant's
argument fails as he is unable to establish manifest injustice. Inclusion in the
elements instruction of the phrase "on or about July 19" does not convert
defendant's conviction into a conviction for only the transaction occurring on that
date where the date is not an element of the charge, the evidence, the arguments,
and the remaining instructions made it clear that the charge involved the conduct
spanning the period from July 19 through July 30, and the eleven-day range of
relevant dates between July 19 and the relevant dates contained in the information
is reasonably seen as "on or about" July 19. Because defendant was tried and
convicted as charged and bound over, both his jurisdictional claim and his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim necessarily fail.
7

Defendant's prosecutorial misconduct claim fails because defendant did not
preserve the claim below, and he does not establish plain error on appeal. The
prosecutor's challenged comments—representations in closing argument of the
testimony of three witnesses—properly presented the testimony and the reasonable
inferences therefrom as viewed by the State.
Defendant fails to establish deficient performance for any of his ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, and he inadequately pleads the prejudice prong for
his claims. Consequently, this Court need not address any of defendant's
ineffective assistance claims.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
DEFENDANT INVITED THE ERROR HE CLAIMS AROSE
FROM AN ERRONEOUS JURY INSTRUCTION;
ALTERNATIVELY, HE FAILS TO ESTABLISH MANIFEST
INJUSTICE REGARDING THE JURY INSTRUCTION;
FINALLY, THE INSTRUCTION PERMITTED HIS
CONVICTION AS CHARGED
Defendant contends that reversal is required because he was convicted of a
different transaction than the one on which the magistrate bound the case over. Br.
of Aplt. at 1, 21-32. He argues that at the preliminary hearing, the prosecution
produced evidence relating to transactions on July 19 and 23 in order to support
the State's case that the equity skimming occurred on July 30, when defendant sold
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the Monte Carlo to the Fausetts. Id. at 21. He claims that the State argued the
same theory at trial. Id. at 22.
However, he points to jury instruction number 14 and claims that the
language of the instruction necessarily dictates that he was tried and convicted for
equity skimming based solely on the transaction with Chade Abplanalp which
occurred on July 19. Id. at 25. Because this possibility had never been the focus
of the case, defendant contends that he was tried and convicted of a charge for
which he never received a preliminary hearing, thereby depriving the district court
of jurisdiction over his case. Br. of Aplt. at 22, 24-25, 29.
A.

Preservation And Review.
Because jurisdiction may be raised at any time, defendant's jurisdictional

argument is properly before this Court, but the claim lacks any merit.2
Defendant's challenge to the jury instruction itself, however, is raised for the first
time on appeal after defendant had affirmative approved the jury instruction below.
Hence, if review is had, it will be for manifest error. See State v. Anderson, 929
P.2d 1107, 1108-09 (Utah 1996). Where defendant also claims ineffective
assistance of counsel for failing to direct the district court to the jury instruction
and seek a correction, the claim is reviewed on appeal as a matter of law. See
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 2, 12 P.3d 92.
2 The district court judge sua sponte noted in passing that there might be
jurisdictional issues involving the jury instruction, but he did not elaborate (R. 274:
16). Neither was he faced with the argument at that time.
9

B.

Proceedings Below,
Defendant was charged with committing equity skimming "on or between

July 19, 2002 and October 15, 2002" (R. 7). Add. A. At the preliminary hearing,
the State adduced evidence relating to the three principal dates included within the
range stated in the information: July 19, 23, and 30, 2002 (R. 267: 57-58; R. 268:
123, 218-19, 239). Defendant was thereafter bound over as charged for equity
skimming (R. 132:45). The court did not amend the information, and defendant
requested no bill of particulars regarding the dates included in the information (see
R. 132).
The evidence adduced at trial focused on the acquisition and sale of the
Monte Carlo and involved the same three principal dates: July 19, 23, and 30,
2002 (R. 132: 44-45; R. 267:passim; R. 268: passim; pi's exh. 7). See Statement
of Facts, supra. The proof established that: (1) on July 19, during the course of
entering a contract for the sale to Chade Abplanalp of a Chevy S-10 truck,
defendant represented to Abplanalp that MSM would pay off the balance owed by
Abplanalp on the Monte Carlo he was trading in as part of the deal (R. 267: 57-58,
60, 73, 78: R. 268: 258); (2) on July 23, defendant took possession of the Monte
Carlo as a trade-in and gave Abplanalp possession of the S-10 after Abplanalp
tendered the $10,000 check from Mountain America; and 3) on July 30, defendant
sold the Monte Carlo to Luke and Jamie Fausett, knowing that the Monte Carlo
was subject to an existing security interest but not checking to see if it had been
10

paid off (R. 268: 123, 239, 240; pi's. exh. 7). All three events are necessary and
important to establishing the foundation, intent, and commission of equity
skimming. That is why the information included a range of dates and the State's
case included evidence regarding all three dates.
C.

No Jurisdictional Issue.
Defendant's claim that the district court lacked jurisdiction over his trial and

conviction of a charge for which he had no preliminary hearing is without merit.3
The jury instruction does not give rise to a jurisdictional problem because
defendant was properly bound over on the range of dates noted in the information,
including July 19, after having a full preliminary hearing, and the instruction did
not limit the jury's consideration of the evidence. See subsection F, infra.
The law is clear that the district court has jurisdiction to try defendant on the
charge bound over. "By the bindover order, the magistrate requires the defendant
'to answer [the information] in the district court.' The information is then
transferred to the district court, permitting that court to take original jurisdiction of
the matter." State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 465-466 (Utah 1991) (quoting Utah
R. Crim. P. 7(8)(b)). Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
the district court obtains jurisdiction to try a defendant on charges contained in an

3 Defendant does not claim that jury instruction 14 requires reversal of his
conviction independently of his jurisdictional argument. Neither does he challenge
the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the alleged conviction for equity skimming
on July 19.
11

information through a bindover order. Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(1). Because
defendant was bound over on the charge in the information, the district court had
jurisdiction to try him on that charge.
D.

Invited Error,
Defendant's argument is premised on jury instruction 14, which required the

jury to convict defendant upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. That Dustin Marshall;
2. On or about July 19, 2002
3. Did as a dealer or broker;
4. Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly
a. Transferred or arranged the transfer of a vehicle for consideration
5. When he knew or should have known the vehicle was subject to a
security interest;
6. Without first obtaining written authorization of the holder of the security
interest.
(R. 167) (in Addendum B).
Defendant challenged the instruction below in his post-trial motion, arguing
that there was no evidence upon which the jury could have found equity skimming
based solely on the July 19 transaction (R. 185). At sentencing, the trial judge
heard argument, then denied the motion (R. 274: 13-17) (in Addendum B). The
judge noted that prior to instructing the jury, both parties had actively represented
to the court in chambers that the instructions were acceptable (R. 274:12-13).
"While a party who fails to object to or give an instruction may have an
instruction assigned as error under the manifest injustice exception, Utah R. Crim.
P. 19(e), 'a party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that
12

party led the trial court into committing the error.'" State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT
•16, \ 9, 86 P.3d 742 (quoting State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996)
(additional quotations omitted)). Consequently, "a jury instruction may not be
assigned as error even if such instruction constitutes manifest injustice 'if counsel,
either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had
no objection to the jury instruction.'" Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16 at ^ 9 (quoting
State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, If 54, 70 P.3d 111). Where a defendant confirms
that the defense had no objection to the jury instructions given by the trial court, he
has invited error and may not obtain appellate review of the instruction for
manifest injustice. See Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^f 55.4
K

Waiver
A defendant's failure to raise an issue before the trial court, even a

constitutional one, waives appellate review of the issue. See State v. Holgate, 2000
UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346; State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313, 318 (Utah 1998).
Defendant contends that he "preserved the issue to some extent" because he
touched on it in his motion for a new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the

4 Manifest injustice is synonymous with the "plain error" standard provided in Utah
Rule of Evidence 103(d). See State v. Powell, 872 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Utah 1994).
When reviewing a claim of manifest injustice, appellate courts generally use the same
standard that is applied to determine whether plain error exists under rule 103(d) of
the Utah Rules of Evidence. See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 1989).
That standard is two-pronged. "First, the error must be 'obvious.1 Second, the error
must be of sufficient magnitude that it affects the substantial rights of a party."
Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109.
13

verdict, and, he implies, because the trial judge ruled on the merits of the issue, at
least to "some extent." Br. of Aplt. at 27-28.
Below, defendant argued to the district court that the evidence at trial did not
support his conviction for equity skimming on July 19 (R. 185). On appeal,
defendant assumes, without argument or justification, that the jury instruction
necessarily resulted in a conviction for the July 19 transaction alone. Br. of Aplt.
at 24-25. He argues instead that the due process provisions of the federal and state
constitutions protect his right to a fair and impartial trial, and that the provisions
were violated by the absence of a preliminary hearing on the offense of which he
was convicted. Id. at 23-24. Because defendant has failed to preserve the claim
he makes on appeal, he has waived his claim unless he can establish that manifest
error occurred with respect to the jury instruction. See Anderson, 929 P.2d
1108-09. However, as defendant invited the error, he is not entitled to manifest
error review. See Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16 at ^f
F.

Manifest Error.
Even if the claim is reviewed for manifest error, it fails. Defendant argues

that use of the language "on or about July 19" injury instruction 14 necessarily led
the jury to convict him of equity skimming based only on the transaction that
occurred on that date. Br. of App. at 22, 24-25. As there was no evidence in the
preliminary hearing or at trial that the offense was complete upon the close of the

14

transaction on July 19, defendant claims he was boundover, tried, and convicted on
a claim for which he did not receive a prelim hearing. Br. of Aplt. at 23-24.
Defendant has been charged with only one instance of equity skimming, but
the parties and the court agree that each of the three transactions on separate days
in July are relevant to establishing the requisite elements of the charge. Even on
appeal, defendant does not contend that a conviction on the charged offense can be
established by less than all the evidence relating to all three dates.
The information clearly sets forth a range of dates during which the equity
skimming occurred (R. 7). The crime charged in the information and the evidence
presented at trial focused on the same period of time and the same conduct. The
parties' opening and closing remarks, as well as their examination of the witnesses
at trial, focused on events which occurred on July 19, 23, and 30. Abplanalp's
testimony involved the transactions on July 19 and 23 (R. 267:57-80; R. 268:25869). Luke and Jamie Fausett's testimony focused on the July 30 sale and included
repossession of the Monte Carlo from the Fausetts on August 22 and
reimbursement in the form of a different Monte Carlo thereafter (R. 268: 122-38).
Shelly Sorenson testified about July 19, July 23, and the "second week of August"
(R. 267:93-114; R. 268:120-21). Defendant testified primarily about July 19, July
23, July 30, "the 7th or 8th of August," and "around the 12th" of August (R.
268:208-48). Thus the State's evidence did not focus on a single date or event to
the exclusion of others (R. 132:44). Rather the State's evidence presented a
15

complete picture of events relating to equity skimming and the Monte Carlo
beginning on July 19 and ending with the transfer of the car to the Fausetts on July
30 (R. 267; 268). Even the parties' arguments focused on all three dates, not a
single date or a single transaction as establishing the charge of equity skimming.
At no time during trial was it suggested that the jury need only consider the
evidence of the July 19 transaction or that all of the requisite elements for equity
skimming could be found in the events of that single day. There is nothing in the
trial itself that suggests that the jury need not consider more than July 19. The
parties' presentation of witnesses and evidence left no doubt that they did not
contest the existence of the transactions involved, simply the details of what
occurred within the context of each transaction. Given the evidence, the parties'
arguments, and the information, it is clear that, despite the parties' inability to
agree specifically on what happened on each date, the parties have, throughout the
entirety of the proceedings, viewed the offense as having been violated only upon
completion of the July 30 transaction.
Additionally, the jury's consideration of events beyond but near July 19 is
entirely appropriate and justified in this case. The wording of the jury instruction
permits consideration of conduct "[o]n or about July 19, 2002" (R. 167). The
charged offense clearly began on July 19 and continued with various transactions,
ultimately culminating on July 30-a span of eleven days. The fact that the jury
took only twenty minutes to deliberate demonstrates that they were not confused or
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divided as to the instruction or the offense charged. Under the well-delineated
circumstances of this case, and the uniform view of all involved as to the relevant
transactions, the jury is reasonably likely to have seen the eleven-day span
beginning on the date provided in the instruction as being "on or about" July 19.
Because the evidence, the parties' arguments, the language in the
information, and the instruction's use of the phrase "on or about" make it
extremely unlikely that the jury limited either its consideration of the evidence or
the basis of its conviction to the single date of July 19, defendant fails to establish
the requisite manifest error. As defendant cannot establish that the jury convicted
him based only on the date of July 19, he cannot establish his claimed
jurisdictional error nor his asserted ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Consequently, incorporation into the instruction of a single date instead of
the range of three dates does not amount to an "obvious" error under the facts of
this case, if it amounts to error at all. Further, the use of the date in the jury
instruction is not likely to have affected defendant's substantial rights where the
date is not an element of the offense (see Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-522), and where
the information, the evidence, and the parties have uniformly presented the offense
as spanning all three dates. Hence, defendant has failed to establish the requisite
manifest error to prevail on his claim. See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109.
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Moreover, as the jury instruction did not serve to change the jury's focus
from the charged offense to a single date, there is no jurisdictional defect in
defendant's conviction, and his first claim fails in its entirety.
POINT II
THE PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING REMARKS PROPERLY
REFLECTED THE EVIDENCE AND ITS REASONABLE
INFERENCES FROM THE STATE'S VIEWPOINT AND,
HENCE, DID NOT CONSTITUTE PLAIN ERROR
Defendant contends that the prosecutor demonstrated misconduct in his
closing argument when he referred to the testimony of Shelly Sorenson, Chade
Abplanalp, and defendant. Br. of Aplt at 32-35. He claims that the prosecutor's
summary of this testimony tainted the fairness of the proceedings and warrants
reversal of his conviction. Id.
Although defendant raises this claim as one of prosecutorial misconduct,
he failed to object to the remarks below. Consequently, he must demonstrate
plain error. To do so, defendant must show that (1) an error occurred, (2) the
error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error was prejudicial
to defendant. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). Where
the plain error claim involves prosecutorial misconduct, defendant must show
"that the prosecutor's [conduct] was so obviously improper that the trial court
had an opportunity to address the error." State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, f 62, 55
P.3d 573. Defendant has not made that showing here.
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A.

No Obvious Error Exists Where the Comments Reflected the
State's Point of View of the Evidence.
Defendant challenges the prosecutor's remarks about witness testimony.

Both parties are permitted "considerable latitude" in their closing remarks to
argue the evidence and its reasonable inferences from their own perspective. See
State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989). The prosecutor's challenged
remarks do nothing more than that. Consequently, none of the remarks amounts
to error, let alone obvious error.5
1. Shelly Sorenson. Defendant claims the prosecutor erroneously argued
that Shelly Sorenson, a loan processor with Mountain America, testified she pays
no attention to the part of the contract which purports to show who is supposed to
pay off the trade-in vehicle:
[THE PROSECUTOR:] Okay. How do you know or is there
a way to know from a contract what the intent of the dealer is as to
what the payoff for the new vehicle is on the trade in?
A. Most of the time it's on the contract if they're paying off
something, or how much they're giving them for cash on the trade
in. Is that what you mean?
Q. I think so.
A. Okay.

5 Moreover, the jury was properly instructed that they were the fact finders, they
were to determine what evidence was relevant, and they were to give witness
testimony the weight which they decided it deserved (R. 154, 172-73, 176-77).
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Q. Okay. So if a contract comes in that doesn't discuss a
payoff at all, then you have no way of knowing who had a duty to
pay that one way or another; is that correct?
A. We, most of the time, don't pay attention to a lot of that,
because it just depends on how they work it out with the dealer.

We, most of the time, don't pay attention to a lot of that,
because it just depends on how they work it out with the dealer (R.
267:106).

[L]ike I said, we usually don't worry about that part of it,
because it's all part of the deal that they're worked out with the
dealer[.]"
(R. 267:106) (prosecutor's closing in "Add. C).
In his initial closing remarks, the prosecutor stated:
Let me just add here something that I don't have on this
particular diagram relating to Shelly Sorenson's comments. When
questioned about the contract, the sales contract which is your State's
Exhibit No. 3, do you remember what she said about the trade in?
She said, "We don't pay any attention to that part of the contract,
because different car dealers do it differently and they negotiate it
differently."
So even though the defendant's going to come up here
through his attorney and argue, "This is what the contract said, that
Chade owed that[.]" .. . There was a zero here, you know. It didn't
matter to the banker. As a matter of fact, the banker said, "You're
allowed $10,000 and we assumed that's all it was." As a matter of
, fact, the person who secured the loan, Shelly Sorenson, said, "I
assumed that Mountain States would be paying off the car."
(R. 268: 274-75) (emphasis added). Add. C. In rebuttal, the prosecutor
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continued:
Let me tell you some other reasons I think you need to
believe Chade's story about this. Shelly Sorenson, she deals with
these contracts. She testified quite a bit. You know how much
attention she paid to line 11 and the payoff amount on this contract
of sale, Exhibit No. 3. Remember what she said? Zero.
It didn't matter, because the dealership makes other
representations. Mr. Sprouse testified that they were going to give
him a $5,000 trade in on a car that was only worth $3,300 to him.
He said, "Well, that's just how you make the deal."
In other words, he's willing to represent something
completely different than what's reality to make the deal, and that's
why Shelly Sorenson says, "We don't pay any attention to that
line," because the defendant represented that he was — that
Mountain States was going to pay off the loan to Mountain
America Credit Union.
(R. 268: 287) (emphasis added). Add. C.
Defendant claims that Sorenson was "never asked" about that part of the
contract and that she said the credit union does not normally worry about
contracts that do not specify who will make payoffs because "'it's all part of the
deal that they've worked out with the dealer.'" Br. of Aplt. at 33 (quoting R.
267: 106). In fact, Sorenson's testimony demonstrates that she was asked by the
prosecutor about the pay-off amount line on such contracts, that she answered
those questions, and that she usually did not worry about what that line said
generally (R. 267:106).
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Defendant claims the prosecutor's remarks improperly stress that
Sorenson ignores that line in the contract because it is usually inaccurate or that
she ignored it in this case because defendant said he would pay off the balance.
Id at 33. However, this misinterprets the prosecutor's statements. Sorenson's
testimony did not blame her lack of attention to the line on any inaccuracy, but
on Sorenson's knowledge of the different methods of handling trade-ins that
were used among dealerships and sellers (R. 267: 106). Defendant made no
representation to Sorenson that he would pay off the balance, as defendant
suggests the prosecutor argued. Br. of Aplt. at 33. Rather, the prosecutor meant
that Sorenson knew that different terms are applied by different sellers and
dealerships which tended to change the relevance of that information in the
contract (R. 268:287). Moreover, regardless of the argument, the jury was
properly instructed that they were the fact finders, they were to determine what
evidence was relevant, and they were to give witness testimony that weight
which they decided it deserved (R. 154, 172, 173, 177). Accordingly,
defendant's claim misrepresents both the arguments and the testimony and fails
to establish plain error.
2. Defendant Marshall's financing representations. In the initial
closing remarks, the prosecutor commented:
Also, the defendant knew there was a lien on the Monte
Carlo when he sold it to the Fausetts, because of all of these other
inferences. Another inference that you might consider is when he
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said, "It would be better if you can finance through Mountain
States. " If he finances the whole thing through Mountain States
you can almost infer that the defendant might have been attempting
to hide the transaction of exactly what was going on, if it had been
totally financed through Mountain States.
Now, these are potential inferences, but the reality is did he
know or should have known? That's the real issue, and he
admitted that he knew there was a lien on the — there was a lien on
that particular car to begin with, and he did absolutely nothing
before he was involved in the transaction to pass it through
somebody else to verify if the lien was clear.
(R. 268: 277) (emphasis added). Add. C.
Defendant challenges the highlighted representation of defendant's
statement to Abplanalp, saying that it improperly colors the testimony because it
suggests that defendant was actively attempting to persuade Abplanalp to accept
in-house financing instead of merely suggesting the option. Br. of Aplt. at 33-34.
While the prosecutor did not exactly quote the testimony, the statement properly
presents the testimonial evidence from the State's point of view. Abplanalp
testified that when he "talked to [defendant] in person," that defendant "offered
me an in-house financing to pay off the Monte Carlo and I told him no" (R.
267:66). Defendant testified that, "I asked Mr. Abplanalp, as I ask all of our
customers, if they wished to utilize our [MSM's] help in securing financing for
their purchase" (R. 268:214).
The prosecutor's argument properly communicated the fact that defendant
had offered Abplanalp financing through MSM, not once but twice, leaving to
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the jury's collective memory the circumstances surrounding the offer. Defendant
may view the statement as suggesting persuasion, but given the parties' leeway
in closing to present the evidence from their own points of view, the prosecutor
was within his right to make the argument because it was a reasonable inference
from the testimony. See State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, ^f 51, 55 P.3d 1131.
Further, the jury was also able to factor into their deliberations defendant's claim
that he makes the same offer to everyone. Where the prosecutor was careful to
correctly label the discussion as involving "potential inferences," testimony from
Abplanalp and defendant supported the basic factual premise that in-house
financing was offered, and a reasonable juror could, but need not, reach the same
inference as the prosecutor, the challenged statement does not amount to
prosecutorial misconduct, let alone reach the level of obvious and prejudicial
misconduct required under the plain error doctrine.
3. Defendant's reliance on Abplanalp regarding payoff of the Monte
Carlo. The prosecutor closed his rebuttal remarks with the following argument:
Let me just say one other thing. As you consider which
testimony you believe and which of Chade or Mr. Marshall, you
know, Mr. Marshall sat up here on the witness stand and testified,
"You know, I just trusted him that he would get the title. I had his
word. I had his word that he would pay off a $3,300 to $3,600 to
Mountain America and just give me the title. I had his word."
So why didn't he rely on his word for the $918.35? He
entered a contract that had to be cosigned for $918.35, but he'll
take his word that he's going to pay off the title for $3,300 to
$3,600. The reality of the fact is and what is really happening is
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what Mountain States agreed to was not what Mr. Marshall agreed
to.
Mr. Marshall represented to Mr. Albplanalp [sic] that he
was going to pay off Mountain America. That didn't happen, but
in the interim, the crime here is when Mr. Marshall involved
himself as a dealer or broker in transferring that vehicle to the
Fausetts, knowing or should have known that the vehicle had a lien
on it, and did not first get written authorization to sell the vehicle.
(R. 268:288-89). Add. C.
Defendant contends that he did not testify that he was relying on
Abplanalp's word that he would pay off the Monte Carlo, but instead said that he
"relied on the signed contract" representing that Abplanalp would do so. Br. of
Aplt. at 35. Again, both positions are reasonable interpretations of defendant's
testimony at trial, enabling the prosecutor to argue the evidence from the State's
point of view. Defendant testified that he believed "Mountain States has the
right to be able to operate on our customer's word" (R. 268:236). Abplanalp was
the customer in this case (R. 267:57). Defendant also testified that Abplanalp
"told me he would pay it off (R. 268:236), and that, "I had no reason to doubt
the man" (R. 268:238). The prosecutor's statement that the defendant said he
relied on the victim's word regarding the pay off of the Monte Carlo is a
reasonable inference from defendant's own testimony. Counsel are entitled to
argue the reasonable inferences of the evidence. See State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App
288,151, 55 P.3d 1131.
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The fact that defendant's interpretation of his own testimony differs from
the prosecutor's interpretation does not render the prosecutor's argument error.
It was patently clear to the jury that defendant interpreted the written contract
itself as providing that Abplanalp was responsible for paying off the Monte Carlo
and getting the title to MSM (R. 268: 233, 235, 240-43). Hence, defendant's
interpretation of the testimony—that he relied on the contract, not Abplanalp—is
reasonable from his point of view and was fully before this jury, Br. of Aplt. at
35. The State presented evidence suggesting that defendant verbally led
Abplanalp to believe MSM would pay off the Monte Carlo. In keeping with its
point of view, the prosecutor's view of the testimony was simply a different but
wholly reasonable interpretation which the prosecutor is entitled to present in
closing argument. See Dibello, 780 P.2d at 1225.
Thus defendant has failed to show material error, let alone error that was
"so obviously improper that the trial court had an opportunity to address the
error," absent an objection from counsel. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, ^J 62.
B.

Defendant's Ineffective Assistance Argument Fails For
Lack of Proof of Both Prongs of The Test
Defendant also claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

by "failing to assert and apply this clear law." Br. of Aplt. at 39-40. Where each
of the challenged closing remarks simply clarified the evidence in a light most
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favorable to the State, there was no deficient performance in defense counsel's
failure to object. See subsection IIA, supra.
Further, defendant presents only a cumulative and inadequate prejudice
argument. He claims that the result of the challenged statements "was certainly
prejudicial" without elaboration. This is insufficient to meet his burden of
showing prejudice as something more than a speculative matter. See Fernandez
v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1998). This deficiency alone defeats
defendant's ineffective assistance claim. See State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405
(Utah 1986) ("If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground
of lack of sufficient prejudice,.. . that course should be followed").
POINT III
DEFENDANT FAILS TO ESTABLISH INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHERE THE
INCONSISTENCIES TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT
ADDRESS WERE NON-EXISTENT, REASONABLE TRIAL
STRATEGY DICTATED COUNSEL'S CONDUCT, AND
THE SPECIFIED ACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN FUTILE;
FURTHER, DEFENDANT FAILS TO ESTABLISH
PREJUDICE
Defendant challenges his trial counsel's effectiveness on several
additional bases, claiming that counsel was ineffective for:
-seeking joinder of the misdemeanor charges with the felony charges;
-introducing at trial the "Authorization for Payoff form without
establishing a foundation for the victim's file to establish whether the form
was in it;
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-failing to effectively cross-examine Abplanalp about his inconsistent
testimony;
-failing to exclude testimony regarding the odometer issue;
-failing to seek a jury instruction on Abplanalp's statutory responsibility to
produce title to the Monte Carlo;
-introducing at trial testimony that MSM normally fills out forms when
customers are to pay of their car loan balances;
-introducing at trial testimony from MSM's manager and Abplanalp's
mother that was helpful to the State's case; and
-failing to object to testimony that dealerships normally pay off balances
on trade-in cars.
Br. of Aplt. at 40-49. Defendant establishes neither deficient performance nor
prejudice for his claims.
A.

Standard of Review.
To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant must

show both that his counsel "rendered deficient performance which fell below an
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment" and that "counsel's
deficient performance prejudiced him." State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48? 50 (Utah
1998) (citations omitted); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
In assessing whether trial counsel's performance fell below "an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment," Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50, this
Court "must keep in mind 'the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel
[and] the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal
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defendant."5 State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689); see also Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521
(Utah), cert denied 513 P.2d 966 (1944). Because this Court "give[s] trial
counsel wide latitude in making tactical decisions," this Court "will not question
such decisions unless there is no reasonable basis supporting them." State v.
Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996) (quoting Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d
277, 282 (Utah 1995)) (emphasis added). Thus, defendant must "rebut the strong
presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action might be
considered sound trial strategy." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 19, 12 P.3d
92 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
To prevail on the second prong of the test, defendant must show, to a
demonstrable certainty, that, but for counsel's allegedly deficient performance,
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome at trial for
defendant. See, e.g., Parsons, 871 P.2d at 522 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
964). His summary claims fail to rise to this level.
B,

Joinder of Charges
Defendant first argues that his counsel rendered deficient performance by

actively seeking joinder of the four misdemeanor charges of arranging or
brokering motor vehicles without a license with the single felony charge of
equity skimming. Br, of Aplt. at 41-43. He claims that the misdemeanor and
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felony charges are "largely unrelated," and that the misdemeanor charges served
only to stigmatize him. Id.
Defendant raised this issue below in his Memorandum in Support of
Application for Certificate of Probable Cause and argued the point in the hearing
on his application (R. 234-45; R. 291:14-17). The trial court rejected the claim,
finding that counsel may have been pursuing the reasonable trial strategy of
presenting to the jury misdemeanor charges to which defendant admitted he had
no defense in order to let the jury see defendant readily admit to those charges,
thereby potentially lending him additional credibility in his denial of the felony
charges (R. 291:17) (in Addendum D).
Instead of showing that trial counsel could have had "no reasonable basis"
to join the charges, defendant argues that defense counsel did not in fact have in
mind the strategy suggested by the district court because she "did not concede or
address [defendant's] guilt of the misdemeanor licensing violations." Br. of Aplt.
at 42. However, the record demonstrates the contrary.
On direct examination of her client, defense counsel established that
defendant was a salesman for MSM in July 2002, then queried:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] What was your position there?
[DEFENDANT:] I was a salesman for them.
Q. Okay.
A. They hired me to attempt to sell their automobiles for them.
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Q. Okay. Did you have a sales license?
A. No, Ma'am, I did not.
Q. Had you attempted to get a sales license?
A. I made an attempt in July. I didn't have the proper forms, and so
I was unsuccessful. I returned in September and did get a license, yes,
ma'am.
Q. Okay. Were you aware of whether or not that was a requirement
or a big deal?

A. I didn't think it was that big of a deal. In other words, we knew
that it needed to be done but we were not aware — I was not aware that
it was as critical an issue as it was.
(R. 268:209-10). With these questions, defense counsel invited defendant not
only to admit the misdemeanor charges but to explain that it was a matter of
ignorance instead of intent. Thus defense counsel actually adopted the very
strategy the district court suggested as legitimate trial strategy: letting "the jury
see him stand up there and not present a defense but only admit readily to" the
misdemeanor charges (R. 291:17).
Because defendant has failed to rebut the strong presumption that, under
the circumstances, joinder of the charges might be considered sound trial
strategy, his claim of ineffective assistance fails. See Frame, 723 P2.d at 405
(failure to meet one prong of the test disposes of the ineffectiveness claim).
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C.

Payoff Authorization Form And Foundation for Abplanalp's
MSM file.
Defendant also claims that defense counsel was ineffective because she

produced a payoff authorization form in response to Abplanalp's testimony that
he believed he had signed one, then failed to establish foundation for admission
of Abplanalp's MSN file to establish that no such form was in the file where it
should have been had it been executed. Br. of Aplt. at 43-44. The result,
defendant claims, was to reinforce Abplanalp's assertion that he had filled out a
form when defendant's position was that no such form was completed.
Defense counsel's strategy was clear. She wanted to discredit Abplanalp
by having him identify the form he told the prosecutor he had filled out, then
having him review his MSM file only to find no such form. If there were no form
in the file, Abplanalp's credibility would suffer, as would his claim that, at the
same meeting at which he filled out the form, defendant had told him that MSM
would pay the balance on the Monte Carlo .
Defendant claims that without the foundation to admit the file to prove that
the form was not in it, defense counsel simply provided evidence to support the
State's case against him. Br. of Aplt. at 43-44. However, defendant's argument
presupposes that the form was not in defendant's file, yet nothing in the record
establishes that fact. The trial court sustained the prosecutor's foundation
objection to use of the file, and defense counsel abandoned the line of
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questioning (R. 268:262). Consequently, the record does not reveal the contents
of the file, and defendant's argument is pure speculation.
Further, defense counsel was faced with a situation in which the person
necessary to establish proper foundation for the file had already testified and
been "released" and "excused" from the proceedings (R. 268:257). As counsel
may reasonably have decided that, under these circumstances, it was in
defendant's best interests to abandon the file and move to another line of
questioning, defendant has failed to establish the requisite deficient performance.
See Crosby, 927 P.2d at 644 (acknowledging counsel's wide latitude in making
tactical decisions).
Further, defense counsel's use of the form was not deficient performance
because, as defendant recognizes, Abplanalp had already testified to having
signed it (R. 267:62, 76). He went so far as to describe the unusual size and the
color of the form on the first day of trial (id).
Accordingly, counsel did not render deficient performance, and defendant's
claim of ineffectiveness fails.
D.

Failure To Effectively Cross-Examine Abplanalp.
Defendant contends that his counsel rendered deficient performance by

failing to cross-examine Abplanalp concerning allegedly inconsistent testimony
both at trial and at the preliminary hearing. Br. of Aplt. at 46. This Court should
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strike defendant's footnote arguments and refuse to address the claim due to
inadequate briefing.
Defendant makes summary statements in the text of his argument
identifying the general subject of each alleged inconsistency, but puts the
citations and details of the allegedly inconsistent testimony in footnotes, with the
result that defendant's brief barely fits within the fifty-page limit provided in
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(f). Br. of Aplt. at 45-46 and nn. 16-18.
Efforts to circumvent the page limit in this manner have been frowned upon.
See, e.g., Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City ofSpringville, 979
P.2d 332, 334 n.l (Utah 1999); see, e.g., State v. Jiron, 866 P.2d 1249, 1249
(Utah App. 1993) (defendant's brief was stricken for appending twenty pages of
argument in the addendum and incorporating it into the body of the brief by
reference in order to circumvent rule 24(a)(9)). Consequently, this Court should
strike the footnotes and reject the remainder of defendant's argument as being
insufficiently briefed as they lack sufficient facts with proper citations to permit
meaningful review of the issue. See, e.g., Utah R. App. P. 24(a); State ex rel CY
v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992) (court refusing to consider an
argument not adequately briefed); see also State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 30405 (Utah 1998) (inadequate briefing occurs when an argument is so lacking as to
shift the burden of research and argument to the court and/or the state); State v.
Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, ^ 27, 989 P.2d 503 (rule 24(a)(9) requires citations
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to relevant authority together with development of the authority and reasoned
analysis based on that authority; without it, review is inappropriate).
However, even on the merits, defendant's arguments fail for his inability to
establish objectively deficient performance. See Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50
(citations omitted).
1. Preliminary hearing testimony.
Defendant argues that his trial counsel failed to cross-examine Abplanalp
with his preliminary hearing testimony that appears, on its face, to contradict his
trial testimony. Br. of Aplt. at 44-45. At the preliminary hearing, Abplanalp
testified that defendant told him that he [Abplanalp] would not be responsible to
pay off the car, leading Abplanalp to assume that MSM would do it, and that the
authorization form was not completed until after the July 19 transaction (R. 132:912, 19). At trial, Abplanalp testified that defendant told him that MSM would pay
off the Monte Carlo and that defendant had him fill out the form to authorize
payoff by the dealership (R. 267:60, 63-64, 67: R. 268: 258, 262).
While defendant correctly notes that his counsel did not use the preliminary
hearing testimony, he fails to establish that counsel's inaction amounted to
deficient performance. He simply claims that the inaction cannot be seen as
"valid trial strategy," that it violated his constitutional right "to confront his
accuser[,]" and that counsel "should have" asked "key questions undermining
[Abplanalp's] credibility." Id. at 46.
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Abplanalp's preliminary hearing testimony and his trial testimony are
consistent. Both establish that, at some point between July 19 and July 30,
defendant explained that the "$0" on line 11 of the contract meant that Abplanalp
would not be responsible for the balance owed on the Monte Carlo, and defendant
had Abplanalp complete the payoff authorization form (R. 132: 9-12; R. 267: 60,
63-64, 67; R. 268: 258, 262). This overall consistency suggests that it would have
been futile for defense counsel to pursue this line of cross-examination. See State
v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, f 26, 1 P.3d 546 (failure to raise futile objections does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel). In view of the "wide latitude" given
trial counsel in making tactical decisions, this Court should reject defendant's
claim of error, because there is a reasonable basis to support defense counsel's
inaction on this point. See id.\ Crosby, 927 P.2d at 644; State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d
1207, 1211 (Utah App. 1991).
2. Alleged inconsistency about when Abplanalp knew he was
supposed to pay off the Monte Carlo.
Defendant claims that Abplanalp gave inconsistent statements at trial
concerning when he knew he was supposed to pay off the Monte Carlo, then
faults his trial counsel for failing to ask Abplanalp about the inconsistency. Br.
of Aplt. at 44-46. However, as any inconsistency was fully explained during the
trial, defense counsel could not have performed deficiently in failing to seek yet
another explanation.
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Defendant notes that, at trial, Abplanalp said he "assumed" that MSM
would pay off the $3,500 balance owing on the Monte Carlo, and that Abplanalp
discovered his own responsibility for the debt when he took the $10,000 check
to MSM to obtain the S-10. Id. at 45, n.16. Defendant claims this testimony was
inconsistent with Abplanalp's later trial testimony that when he called to check
on license plates for the S-10 a month after buying the truck, defendant told him
that he needed to pay off the Monte Carlo. Id.
Defendant's claim is not supported by the record. Defendant's record
citation for the first statement does not reflect that Abplanalp said he was told of
his own responsibility for the pay-off when he brought in the $10,000 check.
What he said was the question of who would be paying off the Monte Carlo
"never really came up until I brang [sic] the $10,000 check down there, and I was
under the assumption the entire time that Mountain States would be taking care
of it." (R. 267: 61). The prosecutor, conducting the direct examination, asked
Abplanalp to elaborate what was said when he brought in the check (R. 267: 62).
Abplanalp responded:
A. After I left Mountain America I brang [sic] the check and
handed it to Dusty Marshall. They already had the S-10 ready to go.
They had the temporary permits on it and everything, and I gave the
check to him, and I said the title's ready for them whenever they go
get it.
[PROSECUTOR:] Okay.
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A. And I just told them that when they go get the title they
can [sic], and I then signed a title release.
Q. Okay, and did you tell them that you had paid the Monte
Carlo off?
A. No, I did not.
(R. 267: 62). In other words, Abplanalp testified that nothing was really said
about responsibility before he brought the check in or at the time he delivered it.
He does not say that he was told of his responsibility when he delivered the check.
The prosecutor then went directly to the sales contract and established that
defendant had, in fact, represented at the time the contract was signed that MSM
would be responsible for the Monte Carlo pay off (R. 267: 63-64).
There is thus no discrepancy between Abplanalp's earlier testimony that he
discovered his responsibility for paying off the Monte Carlo when he picked up
the S-10 and his later testimony that he discovered his own responsibility for the
pay off about a month after picking up the S-10. Defense counsel is not deficient
for not exploiting an illusory inconsistency. Defendant's claim fails.
3. When Abplanalp knew he had to borrow $918.35 to buy the S10.
Defendant claims Abplanalp was inconsistent at trial about when he knew
he needed to borrow an additional $918.35 to complete his purchase of the S-10
truck. Br. of Aplt. at 45 and n.17. This is significant, he claims, because it
directly undermined Abplanalp's credibility. Defendant points to Abplanalp's
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knowledge when he signed the contract that he needed to borrow $10,918.35, then
cites Abplanlalp's testimony that he did not learn of his responsibility to pay the
$918.35 until he took the check to MSM to purchase the S-10. Id.
In fact, although Abplanalp attempted to borrow $10,918.35 from Mountain
America, he could only borrow $105000. He then called defendant to inform him
that "Mountain America will only give me $10,000. No more." (R. 268: 265).
At that point, Abplanalp does not say that "he only learned of the $918.35 after
bringing the check for $10,000 to the dealership^]" as defendant claims. Br. of
Aplt. at 45 n.17. He says he wasn't aware at that time that he would have "to
finance the balance of the $900" (R. 268: 265). He then explains that he financed
it with MSM, paying $150 a month for the next several months (R. 268: 265-66).
Hence, it is the need to finance the amount, not the amount itself, that defendant
discovers when he brings the check to MSM for the S-10. Again, absent the
claimed inconsistency, counsel could not render deficient performance in failing
to address it below.
4. Alleged inconsistency about whether Abplanalp ever talked to
defendant by phone.
Defendant faults his counsel for failing to cross-examine Abplanalp about
whether he ever talked to Marshall on the phone. Br. of Aplt. at 45 and n.18.
Defendant's footnote implies that Abplanalp claimed never to have talked to
defendant by phone. Id. However, Abplanalp's testimony was that he talked to
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defendant by phone the two times Abplanalp placed the calls, but that defendant
could not have called him as he claims because he did not have a phone (R. 268:
264). Defendant's claim fails because defense counsel did question Abplanalp on
this subject (R. 268: 266-67). Br. of Aplt. at 45-46, n.18. Defense counsel began
her redirect examination of Abplanalp as follows:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Is it your testimony, then, Mr.
Albplanalp [sic], that you could not be reached by telephone at any
time during July?
A.

I could have at my mom's house, but I was never there.

Q. Okay, and is it your testimony that you did not call Mr.
Marshall at any time during this transaction?
A. I called him to inquire about my license plates, and I called
him to let him know that Mountain America would only give me
$10,000. That's the only time I spoke to him over the phone.
(R. 268: 266-67) (in Addendum D). Defense counsel not only examined
Abplanalp on the phone issue, but clarified that Abplanalp disputed any alleged
phone conversation with defendant except for the two he noted. Defendant's
claim thus lacks evidentiary basis.
E.

Introduction of Odometer Evidence.
Defendant challenges his trial counsel's questioning of MSM's secretary as

to the company's odometer practices and of Abplanalp as to the accuracy of the
odometer statement he signed. Br. of Aplt. at 46-47. Defendant again puts the
record support for his claim in multiple footnotes accompanying his argument. Id.
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at 46-47 nn. 19-22. This Court should strike the footnotes, clearly employed to
evade rule 24fs fifty-page limit. It should further reject defendant's remaining
claim of ineffectiveness as inadequately briefed. See subsection HID, supra, and
cases cited herein.
Even on the merits, defendant fails to recognize the reasonable trial
strategy behind counsel's action. The prosecutor's questions revealed that
someone at Mountain States had committed odometer fraud (R.). However, trial
counsel represented defendant, not Mountain States Motors (R. 274:3).
Accordingly, trial counsel may well have seen her duty as insulating defendant
from the wrongdoing, even if it was at the expense of MSM's credibility (R.
268:197). That is what defense counsel did. She objected to the odometer
discussion as irrelevant, thus learning that the prosecutor intended to prove
odometer fraud by MSM. She then called Michelle Mansfield, a secretary at
MSM, to testify that what had occurred with the S-10 odometer statement occurs
with all Mountain States vehicles (R. 268:252-53). This strategy distanced
defendant from the odometer fraud in connection with the S-10. This was
reasonable trial strategy. See Crosby, 927 P.2d at 644; Morgan, 813 P.2d at
1211.
In addition, defendant misrepresents the record when he claims that trial
counsel had "no business leading Abplanalp to testify that the odometer statement
he signed" for the S-10 was accurate when it had been established that it did not
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reflect the 350 miles put on the S-10 by the manager's wife. Br. of Aplt. at 47 and
n.22. As support, defendant cites R. 268:263-64, where the following exchange
took place:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] I am showing you two documents...

Q. What are they?
A. Odometer disclosure statements. One for the S-10 and one
for the Monte Carlo.
Q. Do you recall signing these?
A. I do.
Q. What else did you sign that day?
A. The payoff authorization form. I put my Mountain America
Bank account on it, and the Monte Carlo, and I gave it to Mr.
Marshall.
Q. Okay.
A. He requested that I sign it, and I did.
Q. Okay. Did you look at the odometer reading on either of
these vehicles before you signed this?
A. I did.
Q. Okay. Is the odometer reading on the Chevy S-10 accurate?
A. It is.
This exchange does not demonstrate that defense counsel was "supporting]
the government's position" that MSM had committed odometer fraud, as
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defendant contends. Br. of Aplt. at 48. Rather, defense counsel established that
the victim himself had looked at the S-10 odometer before signing the document
on July 19 and that he was convinced that the reading on the document was
accurate, thereby supporting defendant's credibility (pi's exh. 12). Whether the
additional mileage was put on the S-10 before Abplanalp's check of the odometer
on July 19—and the odometer then turned back—or after his check of the
odometer, the exchange tends to mitigate against defendant's involvement in the
odometer fraud.
Consequently, a reasonable trial strategy supports counsel's conduct
regarding the odometer evidence, defeating defendant's claim of ineffectiveness.
See Crosby, 927 P.2d at 644.
F.

Failure To Seek Jury Instructions.
Defendant asserts that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not

seeking jury instructions that more fully informed the jury that Abplanalp had a
legal burden to produce the title to the Monte Carlo within forty-eight hours of
the car's delivery to defendant (R. 268:191). Br. of Aplt. at 48. This argument
fails to establish deficient performance.
The fact that Abplanalp had and failed in a legal duty to produce title to the
Monte Carlo by July 25, forty-eight hours after delivery to defendant, does not
support defendant's ability on July 30 to sell the Monte Carlo believing that the
title was in order (R. 268: 233). To the contrary, it may well have convinced the
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jury of the ^^reasonableness of defendant's act of selling the car to the Fausetts
before assuring himself that there was no title problem. Defense counsel's
failure to raise this issue at trial amounts to reasonable trial strategy when viewed
in this light, defeating defendant's claim. See Crosby, 927 P.2d at 644; Morgan,
813P.2datl211.
G.

Other Instances of Alleged Ineffective Assistance,
Defendant identifies three other instances in which trial counsel introduced

evidence or failed to object, allegedly helping the State make its case and
undermining defendant's case. Br. of Aplt. at 48-49. This conduct, he claims,
establishes that "counsel could not have been acting under reasonable trial
strategy, but instead performed in an objectively deficient manner. See, e.g.,
Moritzsky, supra." Id. at 49 (emphasis in original). This single sentence,
together with a phrase at the end of each identified instance summarily asserting
that counsel's conduct helped the State, constitutes the entirety of defendant's
argument in support of a finding of deficient performance. Such summary
argument fails entirely to meet the briefing requirements of this Court (see Utah
R. App. P. 24(a)(9)), or defendant's burden of establishing "deficient
performance which fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional
judgment," Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50, or of rebutting "the strong presumption that
under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial
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strategy." Litherland, 2000 UT 16, ^f 19 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Further, the only legal authority cited by defendant for his claim, State v.
Moritzsky, 111 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 1989), does not support his assertion
that counsel's alleged misconduct was not reasonable trial strategy. Br. of Aplt.
at 49. Moritzsky involved a defense counsel's submission of an out-of-date jury
instruction, an objectively deficient oversight of the law. 771 P.2d at 692. No
such oversight exists in the claims to which defendant has applied the authority.
Hence, defendant's final argument fails to include any relevant supporting
authority in violation of Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9), further
justifying rejection of his claim. See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998)
(absence of citation to authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority
renders the issue inadequately briefed for purposes of appellate review).
H.

Defendant's Summary Claim of Prejudice Defeats His
Allegations of Ineffectiveness.
Defendant summarily contends that a "substantial likelihood of a different

result" exists absent any or all of his counsel's allegedly deficient conduct. Br.
of Aplt. at 49-50. The claim rests on the "weakness" of Abplanalp's testimony
(without accounting for the non-existent inconsistencies he alleges), the "clarity"
of the contract's requirement that Abplanalp pay off the Monte Carlo (without
accounting for the evidence suggesting a different interpretation of the contract
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term), and the relative values of the S-10, the check, and the Monte Carlo. Id. at
49 (referring back to Br. of Aplt. at 30-31). Where defendant presents a
summary claim of prejudice that takes into account only favorable evidence, the
claim is insufficient to meet his burden. See, e.g., State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48,
50 (Utah 1998) (requiring that proof that counsel's deficient performance
prejudiced defendant must be "a demonstrable reality and not a speculative
matter.") (quoting Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983)
(additional quotations omitted). Moreover, as defendant has not established
deficient performance, his claim of cumulative prejudice is without merit.
Consequently, his need, and his failure, to properly brief the prejudice from each
claim of deficient performance takes on even more importance. Hence, this
Court may reject this and all of defendant's claims of ineffective assistance on
the prejudice prong as well.
CONCLUSION
The district court had jurisdiction over defendant's case, the prosecutor's
closing remarks were appropriate statements of the trial evidence from the
State's point of view, and defendant fails to establish any of his claims of
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deficient performance. Consequently, the State respectfully requests that this
Court affirm defendant's conviction.
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Addenda

Addendum A

76-6-522

UTAH CRIMINAL CODE

76-6-522. Definitions — Equity skimming of a vehicle —.
Penalties.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Broker" means any person who, for compensation of any kind,
arranges for the sale, lease, sublease, or transfer of a vehicle.
(b) "Dealer" means any person engaged in the business of selling, .
leasing, or exchanging vehicles for compensation of any kind.
(c) "Lease" means any grant of use or possession of a vehicle for
consideration, with or without an option to buy.
(d) "Security interest" means an interest in a vehicle that secures
payment or performance of an obligation.
(e) "Transfer" means any delivery or conveyance of a vehicle to another
from one person to another.
(f) "Vehicle" means every device in, upon, or by which any person or
property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, or through
the air or water, or over land and includes a manufactured home or mobile
home as defined in Section 41-la-102.
(2) A dealer or broker or any other person in collusion with a dealer or
broker is guilty of equity skimming of a vehicle if he transfers or arranges the
transfer of a vehicle for consideration or profit, when he knows or should have
known the vehicle is subject to a lease or security interest, without first
obtaining written authorization of the lessor or holder of the security interest.
(3) Equity skimming of a vehicle is a third degree felony.
(4) It is a defense to the crime of equity skimming of a vehicle if the accused
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the lease obligation or security
interest has been satisfied within 30 days following the transfer of the vehicle.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-522, enacted by L.
1991, ch. 291, § 1; 1992, ch. 1, § 208.

6. Mark Thomas, #6664
Deputy Uintah County Attorney
152 East 100 North
Vernal, UT 8407 8
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The undersigned prosecutor states on information and belief
that the defendant, on or between July 19, 2002 and October 15,
2002, in Uintah County, State of Utah, committed the crime of:
EQUITY SKIMMING, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-522, a
Third Degree Felony, as
follows:
That at the time and place
aforesaid the defendant did himself or as a party, as a dealer or
broker or any other person in collusion with a dealer or broker,
transfer or arrange the transfer of a vehicle for consideration or
profit, when he knows or should have known the vehicle is subject
to a lease or security interest, without first obtaining written
authorization of the lessor or holder of the security interest.
This information is based on evidence
following witness: Wayne Hollebeke

obtained

from

the

Authorized for presentment and filing: January 7,

tfark Thomas
Deputy Uintah County Attorney
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offered and received.

2

MR. THOMAS: May this witness'be excused?

3

THE COURT: Any objection?

4

MS. BARTON-COOMBS: No objection.

5

THE COURT: Do you have any other witnesses?

6

MR. THOMAS: No.

7

THE COURT: No other witnesses.

8

witnesses you intend to call?

9
10

MS. BARTON-COOMBS: Let me talk to my client for a
momentf your Honor.

11
12

Do you have any other

(Counsel and defendant confer off the record.)
MS. BARTON-COOMBS: Your Honor, we won r t call any

13

witnesses

14

at this time.

15

THE COURT: Okay, any arguments?

16

MR. THOMAS: I'll reserve.

17

THE COURT: This is an unusual statute, one we don't

18

deal with.

19

what this says.

20

party as a dealer or broker to transfer, arrange the transfer

21

of a vehicle for a consideration or profit when he knows or

22

should know that a vehicle is subject to a lease or security

23

interest without first obtaining written authorization of the

24

lessor or holder of the security interest."

25

I know you want to argue it, but just bear in mind
It says, " I f s unlawful for a person who's a

I guess there's two ways that I could look at this.
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I could look at the transaction —

2

been spoken of.

3
I

two transactions that have

One is the initial transaction and the other

one is the transaction that's been spoken of, where there was
>

4

an agreement to sell on a car lot.

5

the exclusion of the other or both of those?

6

Are you relying upon one to

MR. THOMAS: Well, I think the focus is that transfer

7

of the Monte Carlo's ownership to someone else while there was

8

an existing lien is where our

9

—

THE COURT: That's your focus?

10

MR. THOMAS: Yeah.

11

THE COURT: I just wanted to make sure that's where we

12
13

were.

Okay, you may address the issue.
MS. BARTON-COOMBS: Thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor,

14

I would submit that the State has failed to meet their burden

15

on this case.

16

that Mr. Marshall had asked for release on the title because he

17

was trying to sell it.

18

There has been second-hand information saying

There has been no other indication that there actually

19

was a sale.

There's been no purported buyer, no indication

20

that this car was sold.

21

Mountain States for the release of the title.

Only that Mr. Marshall had asked

22

Under the statute I think the transfer —

or at least

23

some further indication of the arrangement of the transfer

24

needs to be done.

25

Mr. Marshall attempted to have the title released.

The only thing that's been shown is that
Under that,
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your Honor, we would submit that the State has failed to meet

2

its burden.

3

THE COURT: Well, the testimony is that he showed up at

4

the bank and tried to arrange to have the vehicle transferred

5

because he said he had a buyer.

6

MR. THOMAS: Actually he said he sold it, and that

7

is the same thing that he told Chade Abplanalp.

8

admission he sold it.

9

By his own

THE COURT: I think that there's enough here to bind it

10

over.

11

on the sale of the Monte Carlo.

12

there's evidence before the Court sufficient for bind over.

13

I'm glad I asked for the explanation.

You're focusing

I think when he showed up,

When he showed up at the bank at least that that was

14

an arrangement to transfer the vehicle, and that at that time,

15

and that he was doing that as part of the sale, which is a

16

consideration.

17

There's evidence from Ms. Shelly and Mr. Abplanalp

18

that indicated that he was aware of the lease at the time

19

of the sale of the S-10, and he had not obtained written

20

authorization of the security interest at that time.

21

This matter is to be bound over.

22

bound over.

23

and you may have your copy.

This matter will be

Can I get back to you, just because I have it here
I didn't mark on it.

24

MS. BARTON-COOMBS: Sure.

25

THE COURT: Do you want me just to set this directly
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1

for a trial or do you want some time to talk?
MS. BARTON--COOMBS: I think we can set it for trial,

2
3

your B onor.

4

THE COURT : There's no reason to talk about it?

5

MS. BARTON--COOMBS: My previous feeling is that there's

6

not.
MR. THOMAS

7

We did spend actually quite a bit of time

8

negoti ating this in preparation of a preliminary hearing, and I

9

think that this is a matter that really needs to be just heard

10

in Cou rt.
THE COURT: Just heard, just have a jury hear it, be

11
12

heard by a j ury.

13

MS. BARTON--COOMBS: Yes, your Honor.

14

THE COURT : How long will it take to try this?

15

MS. BARTON--COOMBS: At least a day.

16

MR. THOMAS

17

I would say at '.Least we will tack on some

additional misdemeanors that will be heard at the same time.

18

THE COURT: Do you think we ileed a day and a half?

19

MR. THOMAS : Yeah.

20

I think ta day and a half would be a

better estimation.
MS. BARTON--COOMBS: And your Honor, for the Court's

21
22

information, I even' hate to say this , because I know what

23

(inaudible) will do to me, but Judge Benson vacated our trial

24

settin g for the month of May.

25

of May

So I <am now free for the month

.

Addendum B

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

Proof of the commission of the crime of Equity Skimming, requires
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the following elements
of that crime:
1.

That Dustin Marshall;

2.

On or about July 19, 2002

3.

Did as a dealer or broker;

4.

Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly;
a.

Transferred or arranged the transfer of a vehicle for

consideration or profit;
5.

When he knew or should have known the vehicle was subject
to a security interest;

6.

Without first obtaining written authorization of the holder
of the security interest.
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objection was made at that time, and it is incumbent upon

2

that's the purpose of having a Court to be here, and my

3

capacity is to rule upon those things, and so that somebody

4

isn't given the opportunity to just let an objection go by, and

5

then raise it later on, and get a new trial if they don't like

6

the result of the trial.

7

>

The obligation is to raise the objection.

—

No

8

objection was made.

Other than plain error I don't think that

9

there's any document that would allow the Court to interfere

10

with the verdict of the jury, and then the plain error must

11

have interfered with the substantial rights of the party's

12

constitutional right.

13

With respect to the other issue, that's the jury

14

instruction.

15

they were going to do this again, we would put another date in

16

there or we would put from July 19th to July 30tK.

17

J

That was something that I think, certainly that

uly 19th was the date that Mr. Abplanalp initially

18

entered into an agreement with Mountain State's Motors, and the

19

30th was the date where the vehicle that had been traded in was

20

the subject of a sales agreement with another individual by the

21

name of Faucet, as I recall.

22

My obligation here is to see if that date there

23

created a problem such that the Court should grant the motions

24

which are before the Court.

25

I will note again that this was something that was
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dealt with in chambers, and that the instructions were reviewed

2

by both parties, and both parties had a part in dealing with

3

the instructions, and neither made an objection to that.

4

fact, they firmly represented to the Court that the jury

5

instructions were acceptable.

6

In

Against that back drop I need to take a look at the

7

rules.

Rule 50 is the Rule of Civil Procedure.

No one

8

referred me to the rules, but Rule 50 is for judgment not

9

withstanding the verdict.

That's not available in this case

10

because the procedure to bring the issue before the Court as a

11

motion for verdict not withstanding the judgment of a jury

12

requires that the moving party had first made a motion for

13

directed verdict, and the failure to make such a motion for a

14

directed verdict forecloses the trial court from considering a

15

motion for judgment not withstanding the verdict under Rule 50

16

of the Utah Rules Civil Procedure.

17

Under the Rule 59 of Civil Procedure, which is a

18

motion for a new trial, that rule is specifically subject to

19

Rule 61 which is the harmless rule —

20

requires the moving party, in order to establish the necessity

21

for a new trial to establish, the justice requires a new trial

22

and error must substantially affect the rights of the parties.

23

One of the reasons the Court could grant a motion for

Harmless Error Rule, and

24

a new trial under Rule 59 is any irregularity in the

25

proceedings of the court the jury or the adverse party by which
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a party was prevented from having a fair trial.

2

provision requires an affidavit, and none has been provided to

3

this Court.

4

That specific

Another is in subsection (7), an error in law.

I also looked at the rule of criminal procedure, and

5

Rule 23 allows for a rest of judgement, and requires the Court

6

to arrest the judgement for a good cause.

7

however, is that the Court must look at the evidence in the

8

light most favorable to the verdict, and determine that

9

reasonable minds must have obtained a reasonable vow, and to

The standard,

10

the extent that this is viewed as an evidentiary issue, I think

11

that there are certainly —

12

jury upon which the jury could find the defendant guilty of the

13

charge of equity skimming.

14

there was evidence presented to the

The statute defines —

somewhere —

excuse me, there

15

are two files here and I took a look at the jury instructions.

16

I guess the jury instructions are in one file and not the

17

other.

18

The statute, first of all, requires that a person

19

intentionally knowing to recklessly transfer or arrange to

20

transfer.

21

Coombs that there was never a transfer just isn't sufficient to

22

cause the Court to believe that the evidence wouldn't support a

23

verdict because there was definitely evidence before the Court

24

that Mr. Marshall arranged for the transfer of a vehicle, and

25

that he did so with respect to, in fact, both of the

So part of the argument that you've made Ms. Barton-
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2

transactions.
But I think that it's clear to me that the evidence

3

was presented and the argument was made with respect to the

4

violation of the law occurring on the transfer on July the 30th

5

to Mr. and Ms. Faucet.

6

This statute also defines who a dealer or broker is,

7

or who a sales person is, and under the statute a dealer or

8

broker is, "any person who will act and for compensation of any

9

kind arranges for the sale, lease or transfer of the vehicle."

10

The evidence was sufficient to show that Mr. Marshall

11

was acting —

12

these arrangements.

13

evidence is that he arranged for the sale of this Monte Carlo,

14

certainly to Mr. and Ms. Faucet.

15

he was expecting to be compensated on both of
He was listed as a sales person, and the

On thexevidence there's no question in my mind that

16

there is not sufficient —

17

lacking in any way that the Court could find that the jury —

18

reasonable jury must have necessarily found reasonable doubt.

19

Rule 50 —

the evidence is not so infirm or
a

Rule 24 is the Rule's criminal procedure

20

for a new trial, and it requires or allows the new trial where

21

there's an error of impropriety which had a substantial adverse

22

effect in the rights of a party.

23

The motions required to be accompanied by an

24

affidavit, which didn't occur in this case.

25

is that no reasonable —

And the standard

if there was a reasonable likelihood
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that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that

2

violates the Utah or Federal Constitution.

3

With respect to that issue, the Court will note that

4

the day of the attempts is not, theoretically, an element of

5

the crime.

6

it is not necessary that the State prove beyond a reasonable

7

doubt the day the event occurred.

8
9

In order to find the defendant guilty of the crime

There are some issues involving the day of the event.
They have to do with putting the defendant on notice as to when

10

he was alleged to have violated the law, and also some

11

jurisdictional issues that the statute had not.

12

But in this case, as I've indicated, from the time of

13

preliminary hearing right through trial the evidence, the

14

argument, and the focus of the jury of the parties —

15

jury, but the focus of the counsel was on the transaction with

16

Mr. Faucet, and as I've indicated it, my obligation is to see

17

if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury was confused.

18

not the

It's interesting that, with respect to that, that in

19

her argument, Ms. Barton-Coombs argument, she says that, "There

20

was no way that the jury could have found him guilty of the

21

offense as occurring on July 19th," and I believe that's

22

correct.

23

transaction on July 19th, which was actually a transaction that

24

was completed, I think, on the 23rd of July that there was never

25

any allegation that the law was violated at that time, and yet

Now, I don't think that anybody ever alleged that the
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as I keep coming back we have the jury instructions which refer

2

to that date.

3

But the fact that there's no logical way, and I think

4

I'm almost quoting Ms. Barton-Coombs, that the jury could have

5

found equity skimming on that date, and the way the trial

6

progressed leads me to believe that they could have only found

7

the offenses that had related to Mr. Faucet, and so I believe

8

that there isn't any substantial issue under Rule 24 in

9

addition to the fact that the Rule hasn't been completely

10

complied with, which would cause me to believe that there was a

11

reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the —

12

the jury instruction in a way that violated his Utah or Federal

13

Constitutional Rights.

14

challenge

I am strongly influenced in making that decision by

15

the fact that no one ever said, during the whole trial, no one

16

even intimated that that initial transaction was in violation

17

of the law.

18

happened, until the vehicle was transferred to another party no

19

one alleged that the law had been violated.

20

That is, although there were two versions of what

So based upon all of that I think I've looked at all

21

of the applicable rules.

22

decision, and I don't think that there's anything before the

23

Court that undermines the jury decision.

24

motions will be denied.

25

We can then —

I find that the jury made it's

Based upon that the

is there any legal reason why

Addendum C

-2741

Then the Monte Carlo goes back through Dustin Marshall.

2

completes the transaction.

3

there was money owed on this.

4

He's doing the paperwork.

He
He knew

Chade told him.

He testified that he knew there was money owed on

5

that.

6

title had come back clear.

7

that in fact the information that he knew was cleared up.

8

testified he knew there was money owed on the car, and then he

9

said he didn't verify whether or not the title was clean.

10

He did absolutely nothing to identify whether or not the

Okay.

He did absolutely nothing to verify

Why is that important?

He

Because the element in

11

that particular charge is not that he knew, that he knew or

12

should have known the vehicle was subject to a security.

13

you have to ask yourself, should he have known the vehicle was

14

subject to a security?

15

He was told.

So

He admitted he knew.

You can look at the evidence —

some of the other

16

evidence that is there.

17

During negotiations the direct evidence was that Chade told

18

the defendant that he owed between $3,400 and $3,600.

19

was told by the defendant that the zero on line 11 meant that

20

Mountain States would pay off the Monte Carlo.

21

Chade believed.

22

There is some direct evidence here.

Chade

That's what

Let me just add here something that I don't have on

23

this particular diagram relating to Shelly Sorenson's comments.

24

When questioned about the contract, the sales contract which is

25

your State's Exhibit No. 3, do you remember what she said about
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the trade in?

2

part of the contract, because different car dealers do it

3

differently and they negotiate it differently."

4

She said, "We don't pay any attention to that

So even though the defendant's going to come up here

5

through his attorney and argue, "This is what the contract

6

said, that Chade owed that," that Chade owed that.

7

a zero here, you know.

8

matter of fact, the banker said, "You're allowed $10,000 and we

9

assumed that's all it was."

There was

It didn't matter to the banker.

As a

As a matter of fact, the person

10

who secured the loan, Shelly Sorenson, said, "I assumed that

11

Mountain States would be paying off the car."

12
13

So you have to put all that into perspective.

So

14

he also testified that —

15

important —

16

to the defendant, and the defendant didn't receive the title.

17

So when the defendant received the Monte Carlo, he didn't get

18

the title.

19

clear.

20

Chade also testified, which was

that he didn't give the title of the Monte Carlo

He knew or should have known the title wasn't

Interesting development, the Fausetts traded in the

21

vehicle.

22

do with collecting the title of the vehicle they traded in.

23

Now, he didn't do anything here.

24

was told, he admitted he knew there was an amount owing.

25

They testified the defendants knew exactly what to

Shelly Sorenson.

Should he have known?

He

Her first conversation with the
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defendant was after he sold the vehicle.

2

sold the vehicle did the defendant call and say, "You know

3

what, have we got that title back from the Monte Carlo?

4

it clear?"

5

was a problem with it?

6

he knew, but he did nothing to verify if it was clear until

7

after he sold the vehicle.

Never did he do that.
Of course.

Never before he

Is

Should he have known there
He was told.

He admitted

Ms. Sorenson was clear on that.

8

During the conversation he requested it be released.

9

He told Mrs. Sorenson that Chade should have financed through

10

Mountain States Motors.

He should have financed through

11

Mountain States Motors.

Then he also said Ms. Sorenson said

12

the defendant said that she had been told that he knew there

13

was a lien, and the defendant admitted he knew there was a

14

lien.

15

The defendant's testimony is the timing was a little

16

bit different.

17

until afterward, but the fact of the matter is that contradicts

18

his own statements that he knew there was a lien on it to begin

19

with, but he made no effort to verify whether or not it was

20

free and clear before he was involved with the transaction and

21

passed that exact Monte Carlo to the Fausetts.

22

That he didn't really know there was a lien

Pat Albplanalp, she testified also she talked to the

23

defendant.

He acknowledged there was a lien on the vehicle.

24

There are some inferences and circumstances you can take into

25

account there.

The defendant knew that there was not a clear
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title to the Monte Carlo, because he had been told.

2

Okay, and that's really uncontroverted.

3

"I knew it wasn't clear."

4

reasonably believe that he could sell the Monte Carlo without

5

a clear title.

6

should have known.

7

He told me.

He said,

Defendant could not

That's an inference he can draw.

Surely he

Also, the defendant knew there was a lien on the Monte

8

Carlo when he sold it to the Fausetts, because of all of these

9

other inferences.

Another inference that you might consider is

10

when he said, "It would be better if you can finance through

11

Mountain States."

12

Mountain States you can almost infer that the defendant might

13

have been attempting to hide the transaction of exactly what

14

was going on, if it had been totally financed through Mountain

15

States.

16

If he finances the whole thing through

Now, those are potential inferences, but the reality

17

is did he know or should have known?

That's the real issue,

18

and he admitted that he knew there was a lien on the —

19

was a lien on that particular car to begin with, and he did

20

absolutely nothing before he was involved in the transaction to

21

pass it through somebody else to verify if the lien was clear.

there

22

THE COURT: Ms. Barton-Coombs.

23

MS. BARTON-COOMBS: I promised you yesterday when we

24

started this that you were going to see an elephant.

25

see the elephant?

You've been to town and you've seen

Do you
the
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document.

2

knew what went into that document, and that was details on how

3

to pay off the Monte Carlo.

4

Not only did he know that document, he specifically

Let me tell you some other reasons I think you need to

5

believe Chade's story about this.

6

with these contracts.

7

much attention she paid to line 11 and the payoff amount on

8

this contract of sale, Exhibit No. 3.

9

Zero.

10

Shelly Sorenson, she deals

She testified quite a bit.

You know how

Remember what she said?

It didn't matter, because the dealership makes other

11

representations.

12

to give him a $5,000 trade in on a car that was only worth

13

$3,300 to him.

14

deal."

15

Mr. Sprouse testified that they were going

He said, "Well, that's just how you make the

In other words, he's willing to represent something

16

completely different than what's reality to make the deal, and

17

that's why Shelly Sorenson says, "We don't pay any attention to

18

that line," because the defendant represented that he was

19

that Mountain States was going to pay off the loan to Mountain

20

America Credit Union.

21

—

Also, the defendant testified he knew that there

22

was an amount due on the Monte Carlo, but neither of the

23

Sprouses testified that the defendant told them that during

24

the negotiations.

25

Sprouses during the negotiations was the sales price, the

The only thing the defendant told the
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trade in price, and those types of things.

2

They never —

as a matter of fact, Mr. Sprouse, the

3

younger Mr. Sprouse testified when he got on the phone with

4

Ms. Albplanalp he said, "I don't even know what you're talking

5

about.

6

You'll have to talk to him.

He had no idea.

Now, let me focus this down a little bit more.

7

know or should have known.

8

should have known.

9

knew there was an amount owed on the Monte Carlo.
car without verifying —

11

without verifying.

12

Remember, it's not just know, but

Should he have known?

10

Did he

He testified that he
He sold the

sold the Monte Carlo to the Fausetts

What does the statute require?

Two elements; the last

13

element says "without first getting written authorization."

14

What did Mr. Marshall have to do before he could cut loose that

15

Monte Carlo?

16

He testified, "I never even checked with Mountain America."

17

Did he have written authorization?

18

Get written authorization from the lien holder.

No.

Ms. Sorenson testified that the first time that she

19

was contacted at the bank was when he called and said, "I sold

20

the vehicle.

21

got written authorization from the lien holder, which he

22

admitted he knew there was an issue to Mountain America.

23

There is no evidence whatsoever that Mr. Marshall

Let me just say one other thing.

As you consider

24

which testimony you believe and which of Chade or Mr. Marshall,

25

you know, Mr. Marshall sat up here on the witness stand and

-289testified, "You know,, I just trusted him that he would get the
title.

I had his word.

I had his word that he would pay off

a $3,300 to $3,600 to Mountain America and just give me the
title.

I had his word."
So why didn't he rely on his word for the $918.35?

He entered a contract that had to be cosigned for $918.35,
but he'll take his word that he's going to pay off the title
for $3,300 to $3,600.

The reality of the fact is-and what is

really happening is what Mountain States agreed to was not
what Mr. Marshall agreed to.
Mr. Marshall represented to Mr. Albplanalp that he
was going to pay off Mountain America.

That didn't happen, but

in the interim, the crime here is when Mr. Marshall involved
himself as a dealer or broker in transferring that vehicle to
the Fausetts, knowing or should have known that the vehicle had
a lien on it, and did not first get written authorization to
sell the vehicle.
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the defendant is
guilty of all counts.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Thomas.
(Closing arguments concluded.)

Addendum D

-17part of defense Counsel because —

for two reasons.

While you argue that that may have hurt his credibility,
defense Counsel —

trial Counsel may have thought it might have

enhanced his credibility because he stood before the jury and
readily admitted those charges, and I think there may have been
trial -- may well have been trial strategy to place those issues
which you indicate that there was no defense to before the jury
and allow him the opportunity of having the jury see him stand up
there and not present a defense but only admit readily to that.
Because there was no —
facts.

there really wasn't contested

I think that if anything it benefitted him.

I can't see

any indication either in this case that there is a substantial
likelihood that -- of reversal based upon that issue.
Furthermore, I don't think that it's the kind of issue
that I could say that but for that the jury would have found it
would have been a different outcome because it just —

it was

almost a side issue, and I really believe, if anything, if I were
making the call that he got some benefit from the jury through
the jury seeing him stand up and say, "Yeah, I made a mistake
here and I'm admitting it.
true."

I don't contest that, but this is not

So I think may have well have been a trial strategy.
Those are the two issues you've presented to me?
MR. BUGDEN:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.
I will deny your motion on that issue, but I

am concerned about an issue that you haven't raised, and I
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2

A.

I believe I was to pay like $150 a month for seven

months or so.

3

Q.

Okay, and that was through Mountain States Motors?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

But did he ask you about whether or not you'd paid off

6

the Monte Carlo?

7

A.

No.

8

Q.

But that was the same time that you discussed that

9

provision of the contract or was that after?

10

A.

It was the same^ time, I believe.

11

Q.

Okay, and it was your impression, then, that you did

12

not have to pay the Monte Carlo off; that Mountain States

13

would?

14

A.

Because I even signed the release form.

15

Q.

Okay, and the release form that you signed contains

16

specific information concerning the account at Mountain America

17

Credit Union?

18

A.

19

(Nonverbal response.)
THE COURT: You need to answer out loud.

20

Q.

BY MR. THOMAS: Would you answer out loud?

21

A.

Yes.

22

MR. THOMAS: Okay, great.

23
24
25

Thank you.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MS. BARTON-COOMBS:
Q.

Is it your testimony, then, Mr. Albplanalp, that you
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could not be reached by telephone at any time during July?

2

A.

I could have at my mom's house, but I was never there.

3

Q.

Okay, and is it your testimony that you did not call

4
5

Mr. Marshall at any time during this transaction?
A.

I called him to inquire about my license plates, and

6

I called him to let him know that Mountain America would only

7

give me $10,000.

8

phone.

9

Q.

Okay. . Did you have a cosigner for the $900?

10

A.

I did.

11

Q.

And did he —

12
13
14
15

That's the only time I spoke to him over the

that gentleman go with you at any time

to Mountain States Motors?
A.

He was there every time I went to Mountain States

Motors.
Q.

Okay.

A few moments ago when you were talking with

16

Mr. Thomas, when you were talking about the zero balance on

17

the contract, you said the zero there —

18

said, "I'm not responsible."

19

responsible or Mr. Marshall said he wasn't responsible?

and I thought you

Are you talking about you're not

20

A.

I'm saying that I'm not responsible.

21

Q.

Okay.

22

A.

Because I signed a contract with zero.

23

Q.

Okay.

24

A.

Meaning that I don't have to pay it.

25

was under the representation of.

That's what I

